Philippine Jurisprudence

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Alfredo Manasan

2009-11-27T17:41:00.000-08:00

A.M. No. P-07-2415, October 19, 2009

(Legal Ethics)

An order or resolution of the Court is not to be construed as a mere request which could be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. To do so shows disrespect to the Court.

Without the least delay, every court officer or employee is duty bound to obey the orders and processes of the Court and to exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism.

Respondent, being a clerk of court, has the duty to immediately deposit the various funds he collects because he is not authorized to keep them in his custody. He failed in his duty, however.

Delay in depositing funds collected constitutes simple neglect of duty[18] which, under Section 52 (B) (1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, is penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months on the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. It appearing that this is respondent’s first offense for simple neglect of duty, he faces suspension for one month and one day.

People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr.

2009-11-09T11:08:00.000-08:00

G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009

(Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs, Evidence, Chain of Custody, RA 9165)

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. In prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish, through testimonial, documentary and object evidence, the said elements.

xxx

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations.

xxx

For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which has nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of the accused.

The inconsistency cited by appellant refers to trivial matter and is clearly beyond the elements of illegal sale of shabu because it does not pertain to the actual buy-bust itself – that crucial moment when appellant was caught selling shabu. Such inconsistency is also irrelevant to the elements of illegal possession of shabu. Besides, the inconsistency even bolsters the credibility of the prosecution witnesses as it erased any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

xxx

Moreover, we have held in several cases that non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the present case, the integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the instant case was shown not to have been broken.

The fact that Forensic Analyst Albon and the persons who had possession or custody of the subject drugs were not presented as witnesses to corroborate SPO1 Indunan’s testimony is of no moment. The prosecution dispensed with the testimony of Forensic Analyst Albon because the defense had already agreed in the substance of her testimony to be given during trial, to wit: (1) that she examined the subject drugs; (2) that she found them to be positive for shabu; and (3) that she prepared and issued a chemistry report pertaining to the subject drugs.

Further, not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such a requirement. As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established not to have been broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand.

Selected cases on commercial documents and chattels

2009-11-03T05:55:00.000-08:00

WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS LAW

Martinez vs PNB (1953)

Where a warehouse receipt or quedan is transferred or endorsed to a creditor only to secure the payment of a loan or debt, the transferee or endorsee does not automatically become the owner of the goods covered by the warehouse receipt or quedan but he merely retains the right to keep, and with the consent of the owner to sell, them so as to satisfy the obligation from the proceeds of the sale, this for the simple reason that the transaction involved is not a sale but only a mortgage or pledge, and if the property covered by the quedans or warehouse receipts is lost later without the fault or negligence of the mortgagee or pledgee or the transferee or endorsee of the warehouse receipt or quedan, then said goods are to be regarded as lost on account of the real owner, mortgagor or pledgor.

Estrada vs CAR (1961)

(No surrender needed if ordered by court) The SC ordered the manager of Moncada Bonded Warehouse to release shares in palay without the necessity of producing and surrendering the original of the warehouse receipts issued. The SC stated “our order must be carried out in the meantime that this cases have not been finally decided in order to ameliorate the precarious situation in which said petitioners find themselves.”

PNB vs. Se (1996)

While the PNB is entitled to the stocks of sugar as the endorsee of the quedans, delivery to it shall be effected only upon payment of the storage fees. Imperative is the right of the warehouseman to demand payment of his lien at this juncture, because in accordance with Section 29 of the Warehouse Receipts Law, the warehouseman loses his lien upon goods by surrendering possession thereof. In other words, the lien may be lost where the warehouseman surrenders the possession of the goods without requiring payment of his lien, because a warehouseman's lien is possessory in nature.

But the warehouseman cannot refuse to deliver the goods because of an adverse claim of ownership [PNB vs. Sayo, 292 SCRA 202 (1998)]

GENERAL BONDED WAREHOUSE LAW

Purpose:

1. An act to regulate the business of receiving commodities for storage, giving the director of Commerce and Industry the duty to enforce if, providing penalties for violation of the provisions, exempting cooperative marketing associations of commodity producers from application thereof.

2. To protect depositors by giving them a direct recourse against the bond filed by the warehouseman in case of the latter’s insolvency.

3. To encourage the establishment of more warehouses.

Limjoco vs Director of Commerce (1965)

Any contract or transaction wherein the palay delivered is to be milled for and on account of the owner shall be deemed included in the business of receiving rice for storage. In other words, it is enough that the palay is delivered, even if only to have it milled. In this case it is a fact that palay is delivered to appellant and sometimes piled inside her "camalig" in appreciable quantities, to wait for its turn in the milling process. This is precisely the situation covered by the statute. The main intention of the law-maker is to give protection to the owner of the commodity against possible abuses (and we might add negligence) of the person to whom the physical control of his properties is delivered.

LETTERS OF CREDIT

Purpose:

1. To satisfy the seemingly irreconcilable interests of a seller, who refuses to part with his goods before he is paid, and a buyer, who wants to have control of the goods before paying. (Bank of America vs. CA, 1993)

2. The primary purpose of the LoC is to substitute for and support the agreement of the buyer/importer to pay money under a contract or other arrangement. It creates in the seller/exporter a secure expectation of payment.

Bank of America vs. CA (1993)

If there is no provision in the Code of Commerce, follow Uniform Customs and Practice or generally observed usages and customs

Rule of Strict Conformity/Compliance: Documents tendered must strictly conform to the terms of the LoC. The tender of documents by the beneficiary (seller) must include all documents required by the letter. A correspondent bank which departs from what has been stipulated under the letter of credit, as when it accepts a faulty tender, acts on its own risks and it may not thereafter be able to recover from the buyer or the issuing bank, as the case may be, the money thus paid to the beneficiary

Feati Bank vs CA (1991)

An advising or notifying bank does not incur any obligation by the notification. Its only obligation is to check the apparent authenticity of the Letter of Credit.

Negotiating bank has a right of recourse against the issuer bank. Until the negotiating bank is reimbursed, drawer of the draft is still contingently liable.

Relationship between the seller and the negotiating bank is like that between drawer and purchaser of drafts, ie. the involved bank deals only with documents and not on the goods described in the documents.

Independence Principle: Negotiating bank has no duty to verify if what is described in the LoC or shipping documents actually tallies with that loaded aboard a ship. Banks do not deal with the property to be exported or shipped to the importer, but deal only with documents. International custom negates any duty on the part of a bank to verify whether what has been described in letters of credits or drafts or shipping documents actually tallies with what was loaded aboard ship

BPI vs De Reny Fabrics (1970)

A Letter of Credit is a primary obligation of the bank. It is separate from the underlying contract it may support, and is not merely an accessory contract.

TRUST RECEIPTS LAW

Landl & Co. (Phil) Inc. vs Metropolitan Bank (2004)

A trust receipt agreement is merely a collateral agreement, the purpose of which is to serve as
security for a loan.

Allied Banking vs Ordonez (1990)

(Capital goods are covered.)

Applies even to goods not destined for sale or manufacture, and would include items obtained to repair and maintain equipment used in business.

Colinares vs CA (2000)

(Loan vs trust receipts transaction)

This situation belies what normally obtains in a pure trust receipt transaction where goods are
owned by the bank and only released to the importer in trust subsequent to the grant of the loan. The bank acquires a “security interest” in the goods. The ownership of the merchandise continues to be vested in the person who had advanced payment until he has been paid in full, or if the merchandise has already been sold, the proceeds of the sale should be turned over to him. The bank takes full title to the goods and continues to hold that as his indispensable security until the goods are sold and the vendee is called upon to pay for them. Trust receipts partake of the nature of a conditional sale where the importer becomes absolute owner of the imported merchandise as soon as he has paid its price.

Consolidated Bank vs CA (2001)

(Simple loan vs trust receipt transaction)

The delivery to Corporation of the goods subject of the trust receipt occurred long before the trust receipt itself was executed. This situation is inconsistent with what normally obtains in a pure trust receipt transaction, wherein the goods belong in ownership to the bank and are only released to the importer in trust after the loan is granted.

Robles vs CA (1991)

(Bipartite transactions are covered).

In deciding WON the delivery trust receipts covered a trial sale transaction or one that fell under the trust receipts law, the SC found that the requisites under Sec 4 were met: 1) Paramount retained ownership of the office equipment covered by the receipts; 2) possession of the goods was subject to a fiduciary obligation to return them within a specified period or to account for the proceeds thereof.

DBP vs. Pudential Bank, G.R. 143772, Nov. 22, 2005

The entrustee has NO authority to mortgage goods covered by trust receipt.

Prudential Bank vs NLRC (1995)

(Nature of interest of entruster in goods covered)

The security interest of the entruster is not merely an empty or idle title. To a certain extent, such interest becomes a "lien" on the goods because the entruster's advances will have to be settled first before the entrustee can consolidate his ownership over the goods. The law warrants the validity of petitioner's security interest as against all creditors of the trust receipt agreement. The only exception is when the properties are in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith.

Prudential Bank vs NLRC (1995)

The goods covered by trust receipts cannot be levied upon by creditors of the entrustee. The entruster may cancel the trust and take possession of the goods, documents or instruments subject of the trust or of the proceeds realized therefrom at any time upon default or failure of the entrustee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the trust receipt or any other agreement between the entruster and the entrustee.

The entruster in possession of the goods, documents or instruments may, on or after default, give notice to the entrustee of the intention to sell, and may, not less than five days after serving or sending of such notice, sell the goods, documents or instruments at public or private sale, and the entruster may, at a public sale, become a purchaser.

The proceeds of any such sale, whether public or private, shall be applied:

• to the payment of the expenses thereof;
• to the payment of the expenses of retaking, keeping and storing the goods, documents or instruments;
• to the satisfaction of the entrustee's indebtedness to the entruster.

The entrustee shall receive any surplus but shall be liable to the entruster for any deficiency.

Lee vs Rodil (1989)

Acts involving the violation of trust receipt agreements occurring after 29 Jan 1973 would make the accused criminally liable for estafa under par1(b), Art 315 of the RPC, pursuant to the explicit provision in Sec. 13 of P.D. 115.

Allied vs. Ordoñez

The penal provisions of PD 115 encompasses any act violative of the obligation covered by the trust receipt. It is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold, reshipped or stored, but also applies to goods processed as a component of a product ultimately sold to the general public.

Sarmiento, Jr. vs. CA (2002)

The breach of obligation of a trust receipt agreement is separate and distinct from any criminal liability for “misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents or instruments released under trust receipts”, punishable under Sec. 13 of the Trust Receipts Law (PD 115) in relation to Article 315(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Being based on an obligation ex contractu and not ex delicto, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings instituted against petitioners regardless of the result of the latter.

People vs Nitafan (1992)

(Violation of PD 115 is an offense against public order, not property)

The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods - it does not seek to enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no violation of a right against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. P.D. 115, like BP 22, punishes the act "not as an offense against property, but as an offense against public order.” Thus the law states that a breach of a trust receipt agreement makes one liable for estafa.

Philippines Bank vs Ong (2002)

The Supreme Court ruled that a Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the bank entruster and entrustee extinguished the obligation under the existing trust receipt because the agreement did not only reschedule the debts of the entrustee but it provided principal conditions which are incompatible with the trust agreement. Hence, the liability for breach of the Memorandum of Agreement would be purely civil in nature and no criminal liability under the Trust Receipt Law can be imposed.

Prudential Bank vs. NLRC (1995)

Entrustor can:
• cancel trust and take possession of the goods
• file a 3rd party claim or separate civil action at any time upon default or failure of entrustee to comply with terms and conditions of the trust agreement.

Tupaz VI, et. al. vs. CA and BPI, G.R. 145578, Nov. 18, 2005

Here, BPI chose not to file a separate civil action to recover payment under the trust receipts. Instead, respondent bank sought to recover payment in Criminal Case Nos. 8848 and 8849. Although the trial court acquitted petitioner Jose Tupaz, his acquittal did NOT extinguish his civil liability. His liability arose not from the criminal act of which he was acquitted (ex delicto) but from the trust receipt contract (ex contractu) of 30 September 1981. Petitioner Jose Tupaz signed the trust receipt of 30 September 1981 in his personal capacity. Acquittal in a criminal case for estafa does not extinguish civil liability arising from breach of trust receipt contract.

Selected Cases in Provisional Remedies

2009-10-28T21:33:00.000-07:00

PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Sta. Ines vs. Macaraeg, December 2, 1998

Specifically, attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the outcome of the trial. xxx The overriding purpose of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant's property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors. xxx Indeed attachment is primarily in aid of creditors. As used in the rules, however, the term, "creditors", should not be construed in its strict, technical sense. Rather, it should be given a broad construction as to embrace not only a creditor established as such by a contractual relation alleged in the complaint but also all parties who put in suit demands, accounts, interests or causes of action, for which they might recover in the suit any debt or damages.

Chuidian vs. Sandiganbayan, January 19, 2001

The rule contemplates that the defect must be in the very issuance of the attachment writ. Supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule.

When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground. which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was based, the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. Thus, this Court has time and again ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment, otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.

Moreover, we have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance with Section 12 of the same rule.

To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbond immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified therein.

PBC vs. CA, February 23, 2001

The petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment hinges on the allegations which are couched in general terms devoid of particulars of time, persons and places to support such a serious assertion that "defendants are disposing of their properties in fraud of creditors." There is thus the necessity of giving to the private respondents an opportunity to ventilate their side in a hearing, in accordance with due process, in order to determine the truthfulness of the allegations. But no hearing was afforded to the private respondents the writ having been issued ex parte. A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the words of the rules.

Time and again, we have held that the rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly against the applicants. This stringency is required because the remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary in nature. If all the requisites for the granting of the writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Dadizon vs. Asis, January 15, 2004

Issuance of said writ is entirely within the discretion of the trial court. The only limitation is that this discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law. The requisites for injunctive relief are (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

Tayag vs. Lacson, March 25, 2004

The only issue before the appellate court was whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the respondents’ motion to deny or dismiss the petitioner’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction. Not one of the parties prayed to permanently enjoin the trial court from further proceeding with the case or to dismiss the complaint. By permanently enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the case, the appellate court acted arbitrarily and effectively dismissed the complaint motu proprio, including the counterclaims of the respondents and that of the defendants-tenants. The defendants-tenants were even deprived of their right to prove their special and affirmative defenses.

Land Bank vs. Listana, August 5, 2003

Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory order, hence, unappealable. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. Therefore, respondent's special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the correct remedy under the circumstances.

Savellano v. CA, January 30, 2001

In fine, petitioner has not made out a clear case, free from any taint of doubt or dispute, to warrant the issuance of a prohibitory mandatory injunction. It is true that he possesses certificates of title in his name covering several parcels of land located in San Mateo, Rizal. But inasmuch as it relates solely to the issuance of a writ of injunction, the issue is not one of ownership but, as correctly noted by the appellate court, "whether or not the titles of (petitioner) cover the premises being occupied by the (private respondents)."

Private respondents vigorously maintain that the property being occupied by them lies outside of the property covered by petitioner's certificates of title. While it may have been desirable for them to produce certificates of title over the property which they occupy, the absence thereof for purposes of the issuance of the writ does not militate against them. And if the defense interposed by them is successfully established at the trial, the complaint will have to be dismissed.

The effect of the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions issued by the lower court is to dispose of the main case without trial. Private respondents will have to be hurled off into the streets, their houses built on the premises demolished and their plantings destroyed without affording them the opportunity to prove their right of possession in court. In view of the rights to be affected through the issuance of injunctions, courts should at best be reminded that "(t)here is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction."

Shin vs. CA, February 6, 2001

Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. As the facts reveal, petitioners are in effect sublessees, having leased the land from a lessee of the property. "A sublessee can invoke no right superior to that of his sublessor. The sublessees' right, if any, is to demand reparation for damages from his sublessor, should the latter be at fault. The sublessees can only assert such right of possession as could have been granted them by their sublessor, their right of possession depending entirely upon that of the latter. Considering that the lessor and real owner of the property manifested objections to the improvements introduced by petitioners and the subsequent termination of the lease contract between the lessor-owner and the lessee-sublessor, petitioners, being mere sublessees, are not in a position to assert any right to remain on the land. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction that the trial court issued.

Spouses Crystal v. Cebu International School, April 4, 2001

A writ of preliminary injunction is issued only upon proof of the following: (1) a clear legal right of the complainant, (2) a violation of that right, and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction which is a preservative remedy, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act that tends to go beyond maintaining the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded. Hence, the applicant must prove the existence of a right that is "clear and unmistakable."

Even assuming that petitioners have a clear and unmistakable legal right, they are still not entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. They have not shown any urgent and permanent necessity for it, considering that Monica Claire and Frances Lorraine are already enrolled at the Colegio de Immaculada Concepcion. In other words, there is no more need for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction to compel the school to admit them.

Valencia vs. CA, February 19, 2001

On the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, there are three requisites for the grant of the same: 1) The invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2) The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; 3) There is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Petitioner merely alleged the presence of these elements, but did not substantiate the same with convincing evidence. Consequently, we find no meritorious reason for the issuance of said writ.

Gonzales vs. State Properties, January 25, 2001

Nonetheless, the 1997 rule barring the raffle of these cases without effecting the service of summons is not absolute. As earlier noted, the second paragraph of Section 4 (c) of Rule 58 clearly provides that the service of summons may be dispensed with "where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts." Furthermore, even Justice Feria opines that the exceptions to the rule are the same as those in Section 5 of Rule 57, the second paragraph of which reads thus: "The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or the defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or quasi in rem."

In the present case, respondent was able to show that the whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown, and that summons could not be served personally or by substituted service. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such summons prior to or contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The raffle, therefore, may proceed even without notice to and the presence of the said adverse parties.

Manansala vs. CA, January 20, 2000

Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case can be regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Two requisites are necessary if a preliminary injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of a right to be protected and the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. In particular, for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the existence of the right and the violation must appear in the allegation of the complaint and a preliminary injunction is proper only when the plaintiff (private respondent herein) appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint.

Unionbank vs. CA, August 5, 1999

There is, moreover, nothing erroneous with the denial of private respondents’ application for preliminary prohibitory injunction. The acts complained of have already been consummated. It is impossible to restrain the performance of consummated acts through the issuance of prohibitory injunction. When the act sought to be prevented had long been consummated, the remedy of injunction could no longer be entertained, hearing the application for preliminary injunction would just be an exercise in futility.

Gateway vs. Land Bank, July 30, 2003

A writ of mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act and is granted only upon a showing of the following requisites — (1) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (2) the right of a complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Since it commands the performance of an act, a mandatory injunction does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of the former is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.

Marohombsar vs. Adiong, January 22, 2004

A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is intended only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the status quo until that determination. Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.

Merontos vs. Zerna, August 9, 2001

A temporary restraining order (TRO) may be issued ex parte by an executive judge in matters of extreme emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury. Because such issuance of a TRO shall be effective only for seventy-two hours therefrom, as provided under Administrative Circular No. 20-95, the ex-parte issuance of a 20-day TRO is unauthorized and may make the judge administratively liable.

The Circular aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO only to cases of extreme urgency, in order to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury. Such TRO shall be issued only by the executive judge and shall take effect only for seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance. Furthermore, within the said period, a summary hearing shall be conducted to determine whether the Order can be extended for another period until a hearing on the pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. Untenable is respondent judge's contention that the Circular allows an executive judge, in case of extreme urgency, to issue an ex parte TRO effective for twenty days.

RECEIVERSHIP

Commodities vs. CA, June 19, 1997

A petition for receivership under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59 requires that the property or fund which is the subject of the action must be in danger of loss, removal or material injury which necessitates protection or preservation. The guiding principle is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If an action by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, said remedy cannot be applied for and granted.

SUPPORT

Lam vs. Chua, March 18, 2004

Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support.

Selected Cases in Special Civil Actions

2009-10-25T11:06:00.000-07:00

IN GENERAL

Marantao v. CA, January 16, 2001

In cases of appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of other parties. In such case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or record on appeal, the court may only issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal In accordance with section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.

Generally, the special civil action for certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved party has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration, so as to allow the lower court to correct the alleged error. However, there are several exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari will lie even without the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely:

a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h. where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

INTERPLEADER

Ocampo vs. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005

An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

RCBC vs. Metro, G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001

It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants."

DECLARATORY RELIEF

Mejia vs. Gabayan, G.R. No. 149765, April 12, 2005

The petitioner ought to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial recourse. Based on case law, an action for declaratory relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through other existing forms of actions or proceedings. A petition for a declaratory relief cannot be made a substitute for all existing remedies and should be used with caution. Relief by declaratory judgment is sui generis and not strictly legal or equitable yet its historical affinity is equitable. The remedy is not designed to supplant existing remedies.

It may be reiterated that the action for declaratory relief which originated in the classical Roman law, had been used in Scotland for four centuries and adopted in England and other European countries. The remedy is purely statutory in nature and origin. The remedy is an extension of the ancient quia timet. A declaratory judgment does not create or change substantial rights or modify any relationship or alter the character of controversies.

Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004

The essential requisites of the action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.

… It merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal. 30 However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

… Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain. The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised.

Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

Paradero vs. Abragan, et al., G.R. No. 158917, March 1, 2004

The Court is aware of the doctrine that the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. Indeed, it is the inadequacy — not the mere absence — of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, reiterated in the subsequent cases of Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 18 Echauz v. Court of Appeals, and International School v. Court of Appeals.

Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. While there is an identity of parties in the appeal and in the petition for review on certiorari filed before this Court, it is clear that the causes of action and reliefs sought are unidentical, although petitioner ISM may have mentioned in its appeal the impropriety of the writ of execution pending appeal under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Clearly, there can be no forum-shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal, as in the case at bar, and, in a regular appeal before the appellate court, the party questions the decision on the merits which finds the party guilty of negligence and holds the same liable for damages therefor. After all, the merits of the main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa. Hence, reliance on the principle of forum-shopping is misplaced. [International School v. Court of Appeals]

Moreover, even assuming that petitioner’s recourse to certiorari is correct, the same is still dismissible for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the application for the writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Petitioner failed to show that such special and important reasons obtain in this case.

Asian Transmission Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 144664, March 15, 2004

For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65. But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.

PCGG vs. Desierto, January 19, 2001

As regards the manifestation of the Office of the Ombudsman of its willingness to have the case remanded for preliminary investigation, in PCGG vs. Desierto, the Court has also enunciated the rule that when the merits of the complaint have evidently and thoroughly been examined by the Ombudsman, it would not be right to yet subject respondents to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish. The Court finds no cogent reason to divert in the instant case from making that same pronouncement.

ELPI vs. CA, G.R. No. 129184, February 28, 2001

The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.

The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case."

Santos, v. CA, GR 141947, July 5, 2001

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

Indiana Aerospace University vs. CHED, G.R. No. 139371, April 4, 2001

We hold that respondent's Petition for Certiorari was seasonably filed. In computing its timeliness, what should have been considered was not the Order of August 14, 1998, but the date when respondent received the December 9, 1998 Order declaring it in default. Since it received this Order only on January 13, 1999, and filed its Petition for Certiorari on February 23, 1999, it obviously complied with the sixty-day reglementary period stated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Moreover, the August 14, 1998 Order was not a proper subject of certiorari or appeal, since it was merely an interlocutory order.

Petitioner also contends that certiorari cannot prosper in this case, because respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing its Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Respondent counters that reconsideration should be dispensed with, because the December 9, 1998 Order is a patent nullity.

The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It is also basic that a petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. It is patently clear that the regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Hence, the haste with which the solicitor general raised these issues before the appellate court is understandable. For the reason mentioned, we rule that respondent's Petition for Certiorari did not require prior resort to a motion for reconsideration.

Olan vs. CA, G.R. No. 116109, September 14, 1999

Finally, it must be pointed out that the writ of mandamus is not the proper remedy to compel a court to grant a new trial on the ground of "newly discovered evidence". Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.

Liga v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies . . . required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.

DBP vs. Pingol, G.R. No. 145908, January 22, 2004

Basic is the doctrine that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari; it cannot be the subject of appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered. But this rule is not absolute.

Indeed, where the questioned order is a patent nullity, or where it was issued in excess or without jurisdiction, resort to certiorari may be allowed. Here, the violation of the rule on forum shopping is obvious. Disregarding such fact constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The remedy of certiorari is therefore proper to assail the patently null order of the Naga court which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.

Perez vs. Ombudsman, May 27, 2004

As the present controversy pertained to a criminal case, the petitioners were correct in availing of the remedy of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but they erred in filing it in the Court of Appeals. The procedure set out in Kuizon vs. Ombudsman and Mendoza-Arce vs. Ombudsman, requiring that petitions for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman's orders or decisions in criminal cases should be filed in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals, is still the prevailing rule.

But even if the petition for certiorari had been filed in this Court, we would have dismissed it just the same. First, petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman resolution as it was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, not filing a petition for certiorari directly in the Supreme Court. Second, the Office of the Ombudsman did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Ombudsman resolution.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the exercise of power is in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

La Bugal-B'laan vs. Ramos, January 27, 2004

We now agree that the Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits. Paraphrasing Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, it is evident that strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now.

Lopez vs. Ombudsman, September 6, 2001

This Court has held that, "while as a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus, this rule does not apply in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority."

G & S Transport vs. CA, May 28, 2002

It is a settled rule that mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty but does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations. Only such duties as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station are to be enforced by the writ. Whether MIAA will enter into a contract for the provision of a coupon taxi service at the international airport is entirely and exclusively within its corporate discretion. It does not involve a duty the performance of which is enjoined by law and thus this Court cannot direct the exercise of this prerogative. Indeed the determination of the winning bidders should be left to the sound judgment of the MIAA which is the agency in the best position to evaluate the proposals and to decide which bid would most complement the NAIA's services.

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE

DBP vs. Aguirre, September 7, 2001

However, although the notice of foreclosure sale was duly published, the sale did not take place as scheduled on September 25, 1985. Instead, it was held more than two months after the published date of the sale or on January 7, 1986. This renders the sale void. It is settled doctrine that failure to publish the notice of auction sale as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. Although the lack of republication of the notice of sale has not been raised in this case, this Court is possessed of ample power to look into a relevant issue, such as the lack of jurisdiction to hold the foreclosure sale.

Metrobank v. Wong, June 26, 2001

It is bad enough that the mortgagor has no choice but to yield his property in a foreclosure proceeding. It is infinitely worse, if prior thereto, he was denied of his basic right to be informed of the impending loss of his property. This is another instance when law and morals echo the same sentiment.

The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. Precisely, the purpose of a stipulation in the contract for an additional requirement is to apprise respondent of any action which petitioner might take on the subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. When petitioner failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and void.

Unlike in Olizon where there was a valid publication of the notice of foreclosure sale, the publication in the case at bar was defective. Not only did it fail to conform with the requirement that the notice must be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, but also, there were substantial errors in the notice of sale published in the Pagadian Times as found by the scrutinizing eyes of the trial court.

PARTITION

Figuracion-Gerilla vs. Vda. De Figuracion, August 22, 2006

There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.

Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedent’s estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Varona vs. CA, May 20, 2004

It is settled that a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.

Lopez vs. David, March 30, 2004

Under Section 1 of Rule 70, the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful. In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioners’ Complaint was filed beyond one year from the time that respondents’ possession allegedly became unlawful.

We have ruled that “forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes and the one-year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.” Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MeTC when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year.

Del Rosario vs. Sps. Manuel, January 16, 2004

As found by the trial court, petitioner's possession of the land was by mere tolerance of the respondents. We have held in a number of cases that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant occupant the moment he is required to leave. He is bound by his implied promise, in the absence of a contract, that he will vacate upon demand.

Sunflower Neighborhood Association vs. CA, September 3, 2003

It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.

Sps. Tirona v. Alejo, October 10, 2001

A reading of the allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners' action was one for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.

Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior physical possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is unlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency is fatal to petitioners' actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction. No reversible error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court acquired no jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver prior physical possession by petitioners.

Uy v. Santiago, July 31, 2000

Private respondents' argument that execution pending appeal would deprive them of their right to due process of law as it would render moot and academic their Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals deserves scant consideration. We must stress that what is in issue is only the propriety of issuing a writ of execution pending appeal. It is not conclusive on the right of possession of the land and shall not have any effect on the merits of the ejectment suit still on appeal. Moreover, it must be remembered that ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible.

Finding the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie against him. Indeed, mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public official to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public official has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.

Cansino vs. CA, August 21, 2003

It is fundamental that complainants in an ejectment case must allege and prove that they had prior physical possession of the property before they were unlawfully deprived thereof by defendants. Respondents, being the complainants before the lower court, had the burden of proving their claim of prior possession.

Lariosa vs. Bandala, August 15, 2003

Ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be addressed as promptly as possible. Respondent Judge has acted within the bounds of his authority in issuing the orders for the alias writ of execution and the alias writ of demolition.

Bustos vs. CA, January 24, 2001

Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O.G. 579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Laurora vs. Sterling, April 9, 2003

We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession, to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is. No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since respondents' claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue of ownership.

Notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror — not even by the owners. If such illegal manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in the present case, the party who proves prior possession — in this case, petitioners — can recover possession even from the owners themselves.

Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the property in question, respondents had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom.

The availment of the aforementioned remedies is the legal alternative to prevent breaches of peace and criminal disorder resulting from the use of force by claimants out to gain possession. The rule of law does not allow the mighty and the privileged to take the law into their own hands to enforce their alleged rights. They should go to court and seek judicial vindication.

CONTEMPT

Macrohon vs. Ibay, November 30, 2006

Those who don the judicial robe have been reminded time and again that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. It has repeatedly been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of Justice is expected to be "a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals."

Bugaring vs. Español, January 19, 2001

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration.

De Leon vs. CA, February 5, 2004

The general rule is that a corporation and its officers and agents may be held liable for contempt. A corporation and those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs may be punished for contempt in disobeying judgments, decrees, or orders of a court made in a case within its jurisdiction.

Espinosa vs. CA, May 28, 2004

Unlike in cases of direct contempt, which can be summarily adjudged and punished by a fine, a finding of guilt for indirect contempt must be preceded by a charge in writing, an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon and to be heard by himself or by counsel in a hearing. The Court of Appeals erred in summarily punishing Espinosa and his counsel, considering that the charge against them only constitutes indirect contempt. In cases of indirect contempt, no matter how palpable the errant's bad faith might appear to the court, due process as laid down in the rules of procedure must be observed before the penalty is imposed.

Land Bank vs. Listana, August 5, 2003

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.

Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB.

Robert Remiendo y Siblawan vs. The People of the Philippines

2009-10-17T09:15:00.000-07:00

Robert Remiendo y Siblawan vs. The People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 184874. October 9, 2009
Ponencia: Justice Nachura

A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). As such, it is prima facie evidence of the fact of birth of a child, and it does not need authentication.

(Evidence, Public document)

Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, inasmuch as no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being the subject of a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.

What is more, AAA’s testimony of rape was corroborated by the NBI medico-legal examination showing healed lacerations on her hymen. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. When the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

(Evidence, Statutory Rape)

Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.

(RA 9344, Discernment)

Jurisprudence on Forum Shopping

2008-12-25T22:05:00.000-08:00

Equitable Phil. Commercial International Bank, et al vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 143556, March 16, 2004

A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court. For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in one court and another action before another court:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

In the cited cases, we find there is no identity of parties because the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6014, Sa Amin, is not a party in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, although both Sta. Rosa and petitioners are impleaded as parties in different capacities. In Civil Case No. 6014 petitioner PCIB (now Equitable-PCIB) is an intervenor, while Sta. Rosa is the defendant. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is the plaintiff while petitioners are the defendants. Apparently, the parties represented different interests in these cases.

Neither is there identity of rights asserted or relief sought. In Civil Case No. 6014, Sta. Rosa is defending its right as a debtor in a collection case where petitioners are the intervenors, while in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is asserting its right as a depositor to file a damage suit against the defendant, now petitioner bank. Indeed, the two proceedings are far from identical so that a judgment in Civil Case No. 6014 will not amount to res judicata in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, a matter we shall discuss later in detail.

Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. 19 For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur:

(1) there must be a final judgment or order;
(2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

People of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 149495, August 21, 2003

Such move clearly constitutes forum-shopping. As held by Candido v. Camacho, forum-shopping exists "when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in different venues, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances, all raising substantially the same issues and involving exactly the same parties."

A becoming regard for this Court should have prevailed upon to await the outcome of the instant Petition. Making petitioner attend to separate trials is an all too familiar plaint of prosecutors. This fact does not, however, justify a disregard of the rule against forum-shopping or relieve petitioner from the negative consequences of its act. Violation of the forum-shopping prohibition, by itself, is a ground for summary dismissal of the instant Petition.

Luz E. Taganas, et al. vs. Meliton G. Emuslan, et al., G.R. No. 146980, September 3, 2003

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.

The elements of res judicata are as follows:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.

For res judicata to apply, all the above essential requisites must exist.

Reynaldo L. Laureano vs. Bormaheco, INC., et al., G.R. No. 137619, February 6, 2001

Upon the claim of forum shopping, the private respondent has listed down a number of cases filed by the spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Laureano, allegedly involving the same properties, and is asking this Court to declare the Laureano spouses guilty of forum shopping. This is the second time that this Court has encountered this long list of cases, the first instance being in the case of Laureano Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, as in the aforecited case, Bormaheco did not go beyond the enumeration of the cases, leaving its allegation of forum shopping bare and unsubstantiated. Without any showing that the cases listed have identity of parties, causes of action and reliefs sought, neither can we make any valid determination as to whether the rules on non-forum shopping were violated.

Rufino Valencia vs. Court Of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119118, February 19, 2001

On the issue of forum-shopping, the rule is, there is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another and that the actions that were filed involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issues in the cases before the two fora.

The petition for relief in the trial court and the petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals emanate from the same transaction, which is the lease contract between petitioner and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos (RCBM). They also involve the same facts and circumstances. Recall that upon the execution of the aforecited contract, petitioner occupied the fishpond where he invested considerable amount of money. When private respondents filed their complaint for cancellation of RCBM's title over the fishpond, its possession was removed from petitioner, who consequently filed an answer in intervention, with counterclaim for the damages he incurred. The trial court disposed the complaint upholding the RCBM's title. However, the same court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim. As petitioner failed to move for reconsideration or appeal the portion of the decision adverse to him, he filed the petition for relief with the trial court, which in turn deferred action thereto. Consequently, petitioner filed the petition for certiorari with annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. Clearly, the two actions resulted from the same facts and circumstances. The two petitions also involve identical cause of action. Both were for the setting aside or annulment of that portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing petitioner's counterclaim on the ground of fraud. The two petitions also involve the same subject matter or issue of whether petitioner has meritorious counterclaim which, for alleged lack of notice for the pre-trial conference, he failed to prove. Clearly, there is forum-shopping and the Court of Appeals did not err when it declared so in its February 10, 1995 resolution.

United Residents of Dominican Hills, Inc. vs. Comm. on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001

In the same manner, the plaintiffs in the three (3) different cases were made to appear as dissimilar: in Civil Case No. 3316-R, the plaintiff was ASSOCIATION of which private respondent Mario Padilan was head, while the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3382-R was the BENEFICIARIES. Before the COSLAP, private respondents themselves were the petitioners, led again by Padilan. 34 Private respondents also attempted to vary their causes of action: in Civil Case No. 3382-R and COSLAP Case No. 98-253, they seek the annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement executed by and among UNITED, the PMS, and HIGC as well as the transfer certificates of title accordingly issued to petitioner. All three (3) cases sought to enjoin the demolition of private respondents' houses.

It has been held that forum shopping is evident where the elements of litis pendentia or res judicata are present. Private respondents' subterfuge comes to naught, for the effects of res judicata or litis pendentia may not be avoided by varying the designation of the parties or changing the form of the action or adopting a different mode of presenting one's case.

Marcelo Lee et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 118387, October11, 2001

Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action the private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother's estate.

We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.

Roberto S. Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001

For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in one court and another action before another court:

Here, we find that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses, penalize different acts, and can be applied independently. Hence, no fault lies at the prosecution's door for having instituted separate cases before separate tribunals involving the same subject matter.

Virginia Gochan et al vs. Mercedes Gochan et al., G.R. No. 146089, December 13, 2001

Respondents accuse petitioners of forum-shopping when they filed two petitions before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that there was no forum-shopping as there was no identity of issues or identity of reliefs sought in the two petitions.

We agree with petitioners that they are not guilty of forum-shopping. The deplorable practice of forum-shopping is resorted to by litigants who, for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, resort to two different fora to increase his or her chances of obtaining a favorable judgment in either one. In the case of Golangco v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the following test to determine whether there is forum-shopping:

Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigant by a person who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.

In sum, two different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought; thus, forum shopping cannot be said to exist in the case at bar.

Likewise, we do not find that there is forum-shopping in the case at bar. The first petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, which is now the subject of the instant petition, involved the propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. The second petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54985, raised the issue of whether or not public respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21854.

More importantly, the two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial court denying their motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. No such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for the issuance of an order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case and to assign a new judge in his stead.

Sps. Angel Sadang vs. CA , G.R. No. 140138. October 11, 2006

This Court fully agrees with the Court of Appeals that there has been a violation of the rule on forum shopping by the non-disclosure of the filing with an administrative agency, the HLURB, of a complaint raising the same issues as those brought before the Regional Trial Court by petitioners herein. For while the decision of the HLURB may not necessarily constitute res judicata to bar the suit filed in the Regional Trial Court, so that strictly speaking it is not a lis pendens relative to the suit filed in court, the purpose of including the words "or agency" in addition to "any other tribunal" in the non-forum shopping certificate required is to advise the court of the possible application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, namely, that technical matters such as zoning classifications and building certifications should be primarily resolved first by the administrative agency whose expertise relates thereto.

As the Court of Appeals rightly pointed out, petitioner Angel I. Sadang himself filed the complaint before the HLURB and took the appeal from its decision to the Office of the President. The non-disclosure of this fact in his non-forum shopping certification provided sufficient ground to dismiss the complaint. After all, the dismissal is, as stated in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals, "without prejudice."

Marcelina Venzon vs. Sps. Santos, G.R. No. 128308. April 14, 2004

Respondent spouses charge petitioner with violating the rule against forum-shopping by the simultaneous institution by the latter of the action before the HLURB with the action before the RTC. Forum-shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the party.

The HLURB Complaint is grounded upon the alleged refusal of the therein respondent Encarnacion Gonzales to accept payment of the balance of the purchase price in accordance with the contract to sell between her and petitioner, causing damage to the latter. It prayed for, among other things, the conveyance of the subject property to, and an award of damages in favor of, petitioner.

On the other hand, the action before the RTC arose from the purported failure of the defendant deputy sheriff, in connivance with respondent spouses, to notify petitioner of the auction sale, for which petitioner suffered damage. It asked for, among other things, the annulment of the certificate of said sale as well as an adjudication of damages.

Plainly, the two actions spring from different causes arising from different factual circumstances and seek different reliefs. The charge of forum-shopping is patently without merit.

Marina Properties Corporation vs. CA, G.R. No. 125447. August 14, 1998

The issue of forum shopping raised by MARINA deserves scant consideration. H.L. CARLOS was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued MARINA before the HLURB to enforce their Contract To Purchase and To Sell. Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the party. Contrary to MARINA's, assertion, H.L. CARLOS' complaint was hardly a duplication of Civil Case. No. 89-5870 which was filed to collect the sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their Construction Contract. The cause of action in the civil case was, therefore, totally distinct from the cause of action in the complaint before the HLURB. For this reason, neither could there have been splitting of a cause of action.

Venue of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages

2008-12-25T21:59:00.001-08:00

“A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.”

For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." (Saludo vs. American Express, G.R. No. 159507. April 19, 2006)

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a

house therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time... Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue. (Agustin vs. Pamintuan, G.R. No. 164938. August 22, 2005)

As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. (Jao vs. CA, G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002)

We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile'. The term 'resides', like the term 'residing' or 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. . . . In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. (Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Sarmiento, 75 SCRA 124 [1977])

Jurisprudence on Partition

2008-12-25T21:20:00.000-08:00

Peñaverde vs. Peñaverde, GR No. 131141, Oct. 20, 2000

The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, which seeks letters of administration for the estate of Mariano Peñaverde; and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Peñaverde and the annulment of titles in his name as well as the reopening of the distribution of his estate.

Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to share in the estate of Mariano, specifically the subject land previously owned in common by Mariano and his wife, Victorina. This is also what they hoped to obtain in filing Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.

Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the ultimate distribution and partition of a decedent's estate. This is also manifestly sought in Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely calls for the "Reopening of Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peñaverde. In both cases, petitioners would have to prove their right to inherit from the estate of Mariano Peñaverde, albeit indirectly, as heirs of Mariano's wife, Victorina.

Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-shopping. When their appointment as judicial administrators of the estate of Mariano in Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471 was questioned by herein respondent, Bernardita Feranil, 10 petitioners filed the second case, Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, as an alternative remedy, obviously to fortify their chances of obtaining a share in the same estate.

xxx

In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471 and Civil Case No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is also no question that the rights asserted by petitioners in both cases are identical, i.e., the right of succession to the estate of their aunt, Victorina, wife of Mariano. Likewise, the reliefs prayed for — to obtain their share in the estate of Mariano — are the same, such relief being founded on the same facts — their relationship to Mariano's deceased wife, Victorina.

Avelino vs. CA, GR No. 115181, March 31, 2000

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.

xxx

Petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.

People vs. Ang

2008-08-15T23:58:00.000-07:00

Ratio decidendi: G.R. No. 181245, August 6, 2008

Illegal recruitment in large scale, Republic Act No. 8042

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Appellant was charged with violation of Section 6 (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

Appellant conceded in his Brief that the prosecution satisfactorily established that he engaged in the act of recruitment and placement of workers for deployment abroad. It was likewise proven that the private complainants were never deployed to Taiwan as factory workers. Moreover, it was also settled that he received certain amounts allegedly to be used to cover the expenses for the documentation and processing of the complainants’ papers, but said amounts were never reimbursed to them despite their non-deployment and repeated demands. However, appellant argued that he cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment because it was not shown that he has not secured a license or authority to recruit or deploy workers.

This contention lacks basis. It is clearly provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 that any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Since appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 6 (l) and (m), there is no more need to prove whether he is a licensee or not because it is no longer an element of the crime. The trial court and the Court of Appeals therefore correctly found appellant guilty as charged.

In the instant case, appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale because it was committed against the four private complainants. This is in accordance with the penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 which provides, thus:

“Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.”

Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco

2008-08-15T13:02:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006

Constitutional Law, State Immunity Against Suit

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency assignments for the Philippine satellite.

The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union two orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming “the Philippine Government’s assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its satellites.”

PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly “embarked on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.”

Aggrieved by Lichauco’s actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.

The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged “crusade” to malign the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suit is against the state?

HELD:

The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen that would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although the latter has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his duties.

As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any act in relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself.

As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.

As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.

The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.”

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

Osea vs. Ambrosio

2008-07-23T21:39:00.001-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 162774, April 7, 2006

Administrative Law

FACTS:

Petitioners contend that the breach of contract in view of respondents' failure to comply with the building plans and technical specifications of the residential dwelling involves a violation of the Civil Code which is within the jurisdiction of regular courts, and not with the HLURB whose jurisdiction covers only cases of unsound real estate business practice and those that may be included within, or is incidental to, or is a necessary consequence of its jurisdiction.

Respondents argue, on the other hand, that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction, it arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the house and lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

ISSUE:

Whether or nor HLURB has jurisdiction?

HELD:

HLURB has jurisdiction.

P.D. No. 957 Section 3 of this statute provides:

“. . . National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.”

The need for the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the HLURB is indicated in the second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs of P.D. 957 which provide:

“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;”

xxx xxx xxx

“WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate subdivision and condominium businesses be closely supervised and regulated, and that penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices and manipulations committed in connection therewith.”

The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts.

As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.

In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modern world. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, Executive Order (EO) No. 90 series of 1986, "IDENTIFYING THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ESSENTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL SHELTER PROGRAM AND DEFINING THEIR MANDATES, CREATING THE HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL, RATIONALIZING FUNDING SOURCES AND LENDING MECHANISMS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," so named the HLURB to recognize its mandate and authority over the development of housing in general and low-cost housing in particular. Thus Section 1 (c) of said EO provides:

Human Settlements Regulatory Commission — The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission; renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, shall be the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. It is charged with encouraging greater private sector participation in low-cost housing through liberalization of development standards, simplification of regulations and decentralization of approvals for permits and licenses.

This Court has thus consistently held that complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

Moreover, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Under the circumstances attendant to the case, the HLURB has the expertise to determine the basic technical issue of whether the alleged deviations from the building plans and the technical specifications affect the soundness and structural strength of the house.

Petitioners' position that an action for damages is not incidental to or a necessary consequence of the cases within the purview of the HLURB's jurisdiction does not lie. Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the HLURB will be reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as petitioners contend, it lacks the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and acquisition, including the imposition of damages if the evidence so warrants.

MIAA vs. Joaquin Rodriguez

2008-07-20T19:17:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 161836, February 28, 2006

Constitutional Law, Expropriation

FACTS:

Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), a GOCC operating the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex, implemented expansion programs for its runway in the 70’s. So it bought and occupied some of the properties surrounding the area through expropriation. In 1996, respondent lot owner proposed to sell to MIAA at P2,350.00 per square meter one of the lots already occupied by the expanded runway. No deal was made. So respondent Rodriguez bought the bigger lot, a portion of which was occupied by the runway, as well as all the rights to claim reasonable rents and damages for the occupation, from its owner then, Buck Estate, Inc., for P4 million.

Rodriguez demanded from the MIAA full payment for the property and back rentals for 27 years, amounting to P468.8 million. Failing to reach an agreement with MIAA, Rodriguez filed a case for accion reinvindicatoria with damages. Finding that the MIAA had illegally taken possession of the property, the trial court ruled respondent’s favor. The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision, holding that Rodriguez is entitled to back rentals only from the time he became the registered owner of the property in 1996.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Rodriguez was a buyer in bad faith, for having purchased the subject lot in a highly speculative and scheming manner, and in anticipation of a grossly disproportionate amount of profit at the expense of the Government?

2. Whether or not Rodriguez is entitled to exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?

HELD:

The petition is partly meritorious.

There is “taking” when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, or for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In this context, there was taking when the MIAA occupied a portion thereof for its expanded runway. Where actual taking was made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation.

Thus, in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, wherein it took the owner of a parcel of land thirty-five (35) years before she filed a case for recovery of possession taken by the local government unit for a road-right-of-way purpose, this Court held:

…there being no other legal provision cited which would justify a departure from the rule that just compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the taking thereof in expropriation by the Government, not the increased value resulting from the passage of time which invariably brings unearned increment to landed properties, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation for the property taken.

The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that —

". . . (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses.

The subject lot was occupied as a runway of the MIAA starting in 1972. Thus, the value of the lot in 1972 should serve as the basis for the award of compensation to the owner.

On actual damages for the occupation of the subject lot, undeniably, the MIAA’s illegal occupation for more than 20 years has resulted in pecuniary loss to Rodriguez and his predecessors-in-interest. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking. Case laws ruled that the indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with a property owner’s right to be paid legal interest on the value of the property, for if the condemnor is to pay the compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment of such compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property, and hence, there is no basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking.

On buyer in bad faith, the point is irrelevant. Regardless of whether or not Rodriguez acted in bad faith, all that he will be entitled to is the value of the property at the time of the taking, with legal interest thereon from that point until full payment of the compensation by the MIAA. There is nothing wrongful or dishonest in expecting to profit from one’s investment. However, Rodriguez can fault but only himself for taking an obvious risk in purchasing property already being used for a public purpose. To our mind, these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order.

San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC

2008-07-10T05:21:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 147566, December 6, 2006

Labor Law, Employer-Employee Relationship

Quotable Quote (Justice Garcia):

“The contrivances may be many and the schemes ingenious and imaginative. But this Court will not hesitate to put pen to a line and defend the worker’s right to be secure in his (or her) proprietary right to regular employment and his right to a secure employment..”

FACTS:

San Miguel Corporation (SMC) seeks to reverse a Court of Appeals (CA) decision which affirmed an NLRC declaration that private respondent Rafael Maliksi (Maliksi) is a regular employee of SMC and must be reinstated with benefits.

Maliksi in October 16, 1990 sued SMC-Magnolia Division and Philippine Software Services and Education Center (PHILSSEC) for them to recognize him as a regular employee. Later on the same case he included the charge of illegal dismissal when petitioners terminated his services later that month. Maliksi’s employment record shows he served SMC alternately as budget head, accounting clerk and acting clerk under Skillpower, Lipercon and PHILSSEC between 1981 up to February 1985 “for periods spread apart,” or for at least three years and seven months.

Respondent Maliksi maintained that he is an employee of SMC-Magnolia and that Lipercon, Skillpower, Inc. and PHILSSEC are labor-only contractors, none being his employer. PHILSSEC meanwhile disclaimed liability as it catered only to computerized accounting needs of businesses like SMC-Magnolia, PHILSSEC’s principal function being that of manual control of data needed during the computerization. PHILSSEC added that it controlled Maliksi’s work, paid his salary and required him to report directly to it. Maliksi was terminated because the project was completed on October 31, 1990. SMC for its part basically asserted the same, contending that PHILSSEC exercised exclusive managerial prerogative over the complainant as to hiring, payment of salary, dismissal and the control over his work. It was interested only in the result of the work specified in the contract but not as to the means and methods of accomplishing the same. Also, PHILSSEC has substantial capital of its own. What it markets to clients are computer programs and training systems on computer technology and not the usual labor or manpower supply to establishment concerns. Further, SMC said, Maliksi’s service has no relation to the principal business of SMC, which is food and beverage.

The Labor Arbiter declared Maliksi a regular employee of PHILSSEC and absolved SMC from liability. Maliksi appealed to the NLRC which in turn reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision, ordering SMC-Magnolia Division to reinstate him without loss of seniority rights and with full benefits. When the case reached the CA, the latter affirmed in toto the NLRC’s decision, finding Lipercon and Skillpower as mere conduits to circumvent Article 280 of the Labor Code, employing Maliksi as contractual or project employee through these entities, thereby undermining his right to gain regular employment status under the law. The CA agreed with the NLRC that Maliksi’s work was necessary or desirable in the business of SMC in its Magnolia Division, for more than the required one-year period, and that he became permanent and regular with SMC after the statutory period of one year of service. The CA also concluded that on account of his past employment contracts with SMC under Lipercon and Skillpower, Maliksi was already a regular employee of SMC when he entered into SMC’s computerization project as part of the PHILSSEC project complement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maliksi was a regular employee of SMC?

HELD:

Petition DENIED. Maliksi is a regular employee of SMC. Lipercon and Skillpower are labor-only contractors providing as they do personnel services to the public for a fee. There is an employer-employee relationship and the Court gives due deference to this factual findings of both the NLRC and the CA. Having served SMC for an aggregate period of more than three (3) years through employment contracts with these Lipercon and Skillpower, Maliksi should be considered as SMC’s regular employee. The fact is that he was hired and re-hired by SMC to perform administrative and clerical work that was necessary to SMC’s business on a daily basis.

In Bustamante v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that petitioners were employees engaged to perform activities necessary in the usual business of the employer. The contract for probationary employment was utilized by respondent company as a chicanery to deny petitioners their status as regular employees and to evade paying them the benefits attached to such status. They were hired and re-hired in a span of from two to four years to do the same type of work which conclusively shows the necessity of petitioners’ service to the respondent company’s business.

With respect to PHILSSEC, there was no need for Maliksi to be employed under the former’s computerization program to be considered a regular employee of SMC at the time. Moreover, SMC itself admits that Maliksi’s work under the computerization program did “not require the operation of a computer system, such as the software program being developed by PHILSSEC.” Maliksi’s work under the PHILSSEC project was mainly administrative in nature and necessary to the development of SMC’s business.

Maliksi was juggled from one employment contract to another in a continuous bid to circumvent labor laws. The act of hiring and re-hiring workers over a period of time without considering them as regular employees evidences bad faith on the part of the employer making it liable to pay damages. The contrivances may be many and the schemes ingenious and imaginative. But this Court will not hesitate to put pen to a line and defend the worker’s right to be secure in his (or her) proprietary right to regular employment and his right to a secure employment, viz, one that is free from fear and doubt, that anytime he could be removed, retrenched, his contract not renewed or he might not be re-hired.

Considering, however, the supervening event that SMC’s Magnolia Division has been acquired by another entity, respondent Maliksi’s reinstatement it appears is no longer feasible. Instead, he should be awarded separation, in addition to the other monetary awards, pay as an alternative. Likewise, owing to petitioner’s bad faith in juggling the latter from one labor contractor to another, it should be held liable to pay nominal damages for causing undue injury and inconvenience to the private respondent in its contractual hiring-firing-rehiring scheme and for denying him his proprietary right to regular employment.

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Sime Darby Employees vs. NLRC

2008-07-09T02:32:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 148021, December 6, 2006

Labor Law, NLRC Procedure, Illegal Dismissal

FACTS:

Sime Darby Pilipinas (the Company) declared and implemented a lockout against all the hourly employees of its tire factory on the ground of sabotage and work slowdown. This after failed negotiations with Sime Darby Employees Association (the Union) for the remaining two years of their CBA. The Union contested the lockout before the DOLE-NLRC. Subsequently the company decided to sell its tire manufacturing assets and close the business. As a result, all employees were terminated, including the petitioners. The company later found a buyer of its assets and business in Goodyear Philippines, Inc..

Petitioners filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the DOLE and later a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), both cases eventually consolidated. The labor arbiter ordered the parties to submit their respective memorandum but instead of doing this, the Union filed an Appeal Memorandum with a petition for injunction and/or a TRO before the NLRC. The labor arbiter later dismissed the case for lack of merit. It found the lockout valid and legal, and justified by the incidents of continued work slowdown, mass absences, and consistent low production output, high rate of waste and scrap tires and machine breakdown. It also considered the mass termination of all the employees valid as an authorized termination of employment due to closure of the establishment, the company having complied with due process.

Petitioners appealed the labor arbiter’s Decision to the NLRC which was also dismissed for lack of merit. It also ruled that that the labor arbiter could not have lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioners appealed the former’s order since the order was interlocutory in nature and cannot be appealed separately. In the Court of Appeals, the petition was similarly denied.

Petitioners reiterate that they were denied due process when they were dismissed right on the day they were handed down their termination letters, without the benefit of the thirty (30)-day notice as required by law, and invoke the Court’s ruling in Serrano v. NLRC; that the labor arbiter had lost jurisdiction over the issue when have already perfected their appeal to the NLRC; and that labor arbiter deprived petitioners of the chance to present their evidence during the formal trial.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the labor arbiter has lost jurisdiction over the Union’s petition due to the appeal on the labor arbiter’s order that the Union filed before the NLRC?

2. Whether or not petitioners were deprived by the labor arbiter of the right to a presentation of evidence in a formal trial?

3. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed due to lack of due process and also as a consequence of an illegal lockout?

HELD:

Petition DENIED. Decision affirmed as the labor arbiter never lost its jurisdiction to decide on the case and has decided the case without grave abuse of discretion. The Court gives due credence to the factual findings of the labor arbiter and NLRC.

The order by the labor arbiter to the parties to submit their respective memorandum is in the nature of an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts. Nor could the Court finds any grave abuse of discretion on the labor arbiter’s part. For one, the holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC grants the labor arbiter wide latitude to determine, after the submission by the parties of their position papers/memoranda, if there is need for a formal trial or hearing.

Petitioners’ argument that had the labor arbiter allowed respondents to present their evidence during the formal trial, the Decision would have been different, cannot be sustained. As previously stated, the labor arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining whether there is a need for a formal hearing in a given case, and he or she may use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case without regard to technicalities. When the parties submitted their position papers and other pertinent pleadings to the labor arbiter, it is understood / given /deemed that they have included therein all the pieces of evidence needed to establish their respective cases. A formal hearing is not compulsory in consonance with the need for speedy disposition of labor cases. If it were necessary, the parties may then willfully withhold their evidence and disclose the same only during the formal hearing, thus creating surprises which could merely complicate the issues and prolong the trial. There is a dire need to lessen technicalities in the process of settling labor disputes.

Well-settled is the rule that hearings and resolutions of labor disputes are not governed by the strict and technical rules of evidence and procedure observed in the regular courts of law. Technical rules of procedure are not applicable in labor cases, but may apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character, for instance, when there is a need to attain substantial justice and an expeditious, practical and convenient solution to a labor problem.

Petitioners claim that the alleged failure of the company to notify them of their termination renders their dismissal illegal, and thus they should be reinstated and paid with full backwages or given separation pay, following the Court’s ruling in Serrano v. Court of Appeals. The argument does not hold. The ruling in Serrano has already been superseded by the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relation Commission. The Agabon enunciates the new doctrine that if the dismissal is for just cause but statutory due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

But in any case, the issue of illegal dismissal had already been resolved by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, which both found that the company had an authorized cause and had complied with the requirements of due process when it dismissed petitioners.

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Pamplona Plantation Company vs. Ramon Acosta

2008-07-08T02:17:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 153193, December 6, 2006

Labor Law, Liability of Corporation Officers

FACTS:

This stems from a case before the Labor Arbiter for underpayment, overtime pay, premium pay for rest day and holiday, service incentive leave pay, damages, attorney’s fees, and 13th month pay. The complainants claimed that they were regular rank and file employees of petitioner Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc. with different hiring periods, work designations, and salary rates.

Petitioner, however, denied this, alleging that some of the complainants are seasonal employees, some are contractors, others were hired under the pakyaw system, while the rest were hired by the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation, which has a separate and distinct entity from it.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) held petitioner and Pamplona Plantation’s manager, Jose Luis Bondoc, liable for underpayment as complainants were regular employees of petitioner. They were also held guilty of illegal dismissal with regard to two complainants.

The NLRC reversed the LA’s decision, dismissing all the complaints, finding that the complaint should have been directed against the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation since complainants’ individual affidavits contained the allegations that their tasks pertained to their work “in the golf course.”

The Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the NLRC’s dismissal and reinstated the LA’s Decision with modification.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Pamplona Plantation is liable for the wage differentials of the worker-respondents who themselves admitted in their affidavits that their employer was another entity – Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation?

2) Whether or not Pamplona Plantation’s manager is personally liable for the money claims awarded to the workers?

HELD:

Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED.

For the purpose of resolving the workers’ claims, Pamplona Plantation and Pamplona Leisure are hereby deemed one and the same entity. The CA is MODIFIED in that the manager of Pamplona Plantation is absolved of any personal liability as regards the money claims awarded to respondents.

In all other respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is estopped from denying that respondents worked for it. It never raised this defense in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Notably, the defense it raised pertained to the nature of respondents’ employment, i.e., whether they are seasonal employees, contractors, or worked under the pakyaw system. Thus, in its Position Paper, petitioner alleged that some of the respondents are coconut filers and copra hookers or sakadors; some are seasonal employees who worked as scoopers or lugiteros; some are contractors; and some worked under the pakyaw system. In support of these allegations, petitioner even presented the company’s payroll.

By setting forth these defenses, petitioner, in effect, admitted that respondents worked for it, albeit in different capacities. Such allegations are negative pregnants – denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied, and amounts to an acknowledgement that respondents were indeed employed by petitioner.

Reiterating Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil, the Court holds that by piercing the veil of corporate fiction, the two corporations – the Pamplona Plantation Corporation, Inc. and the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation – are one and the same. An examination of the facts reveals that, for both the coconut plantation and the golf course, there is only one management which the laborers deal with regarding their work. A portion of the plantation (also called Hacienda Pamplona) had actually been converted into a golf course and other recreational facilities. The weekly payrolls issued by petitioner-company bore the name “Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc.”

It is also a fact that respondents all received their pay from the same person, Bondoc -- the managing director of the company. True, Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc., and the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation appear to be separate corporate entities. But it is settled that this fiction of law cannot be invoked to further an end subversive of justice. The corporations have basically the same incorporators and directors and are headed by the same official. Both use only one office and one payroll and are under one management. The attempt to make the two corporations appear as two separate entities, insofar as the workers are concerned, should be viewed as a devious but obvious means to defeat the ends of the law. Such a ploy should not be permitted to cloud the truth and perpetrate an injustice. Also, just because they worked at the golf course did not necessarily mean that they were not employed to do other tasks, especially since the golf course was merely a portion of the coconut plantation. Thus, petitioner cannot now deny that respondents are its employees.

As to the issue on the dismissal of one particular worker, Joselito Tinghil, it is well-settled that the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a valid and just cause. Failure to discharge this burden of proof substantially means that the dismissal was not justified and therefore, illegal. Given petitioner’s failure to discharge this burden, the Court sustains the finding of illegal dismissal vis-à-vis respondent Joselito Tinghil.

Lastly, petitioner believes that its manager, Jose Luis Bondoc, should not have been held solidarily liable with the company for the wage differentials awarded to respondents. Petitioner argues that Bondoc is merely an employee of the company and not a corporate director or officer who can be held personally liable therefor.

The rule is that officers of a corporation are not personally liable for their official acts unless it is shown that they have exceeded their authority. However, the legal fiction that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from stockholders and members may be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetuate fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues. Moreover, assuming Bondoc is a corporate officer, a corporate officer is not personally liable for the money claims of discharged corporate employees unless he acted with evident malice and bad faith in terminating their employment.

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People vs. Cabalquinto

2008-07-02T08:34:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006

Criminal Law, RA 7610, RA 9262

FACTS:

Cabalquinto was accused of raping his eight-year old daughter seven times. He was found guilty of by the Regional Trial Court for rape on two counts and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. The victim testified that her father had raped her seven times since her mother left for abroad. A medical certificate and the testimony of the mother further supported the charge. But the defense pointed out some inconsistencies between the testimony of the victim and her mother on certain circumstances of the alleged rape events. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and also ordered payment of damages.

ISSUE:

Is Cabalquinto guilty of rape?

HELD:

Affirmed.

Supreme Court meticulously and painstakingly examined the records as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes and found no cause to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

The mother’s testimony that she witnessed the act of rape corroborates the victim-daughter’s account. The inconsistency between the testimony of AAA and her mother pertains merely to a circumstance that is of little consequence to the question of whether rape was actually committed. Whether the victim cried out or not does not discount rape. It should be emphasized that the victim was only eight years old when she was raped. A child of her tender years cannot be expected to be able to recount the details of her torment with exactitude.

Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as defined under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and is qualified when the offender is a parent of the victim, in which case, the death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the Death Penalty Law. In this case, the qualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship with the accused as the latter’s daughter were properly alleged in the Informations, proven during trial and not refuted by Cabalquinto. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed.

The accused is sentenced, in each of the criminal cases reviewed, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count.

Moral damages, separate and distinct from the civil indemnity, are automatically granted in rape cases. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed to deter fathers with aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing their daughters.

NOTA BENE:

What was notable in this case was the Supreme Court’s pronouncement, in relation to Republic Act 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) and Republic Act 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004), on the confidential nature a rape trial. According to the Court, these laws uniformly seek to respect the dignity and protect the privacy of women and their children. The Court thus withheld the real name of the victim, and used fictitious initials instead to represent her.

Gudani vs. Senga

2008-06-28T00:29:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006

Political Law, E.O. 464

FACTS:

Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon.

Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.

However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. `

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee “in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;” that such directive was “in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command;” and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x” Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.

On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.

Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive.

The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional?

HELD:

The Petition is dismissed.

Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?

Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under “house arrest” by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:

“… to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.”

As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldier’s speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldier’s ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Judicial relief as remedy:

The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.

Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branch’s assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, “all officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP],” and points out that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

Huyssen vs. Gutierrez

2008-06-27T09:55:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation officer, received US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen. Accused of falsely representing that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa and failing to return the same, respondent denied misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa. He failed however to substantiate such denial.

Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not immediately be returned to the complainant, and promised her several times that he would repay her out of his personal funds. He even issued personal post-dated checks on this, but which later bounced.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and merits the penalty of disbarment?

HELD:

Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled that denial, which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability. The evidence, respondent’s letters to the complainant, shows that he made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. If this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use.

Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."

Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's acts are more despicable, for not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.

A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for, among other acts, gross misconduct in office.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. The case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.

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Lorenza Ortega vs. Court of Appeals

2008-06-25T09:36:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 125302, November 16, 1998

Remedial Law, Civil Procedure

FACTS:

The deputy sheriff auctioned the attached real properties of the defendant spouses Tibajia and awarded it to the highest bidder Lorenza Ortega in the amount of P448,989.50, credited to fully pay the judgment debt of spouses Tibajia to the Heirs of Felipe L. Abel.

As the twelve-month redemption period was about to expire, the defendants filed a motion to lift or set aside the writs of attachment and execution after paying through Aurora Tibajia Vito the redemption price plus other charges required by law. On the other hand, petitioner Ortega filed an "Urgent Ex Parte Motion for an Order of New Title and Issuance of Owner's Certificate of Title,", followed by a "Supplementary Motion for Issuance of New Titles". She also participated in evidentiary hearings regarding the issue of padded costs in computing the redemption price.

The trial court ordered petitioner Ortega to accept the payment of redemption price, and to refund to defendant spouses Tibajia the excess deposit. It also ordered issuance of the certificate of redemption in favor of the defendants.

Eden Tan (assignee of the Heirs of Felipe L. Abel) and petitioner Ortega (purchaser at the execution sale) appealed the order. The Court of Appeals dismissed Ortega’s petition for lack of locus standi, citing that only parties can appeal from a final judgment or order of a court pursuant to Sec. 1 Rule 41 and Sec. 1, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

According to the Court of Appeals, the Brief filed by Eden Tan is styled: 'Felipe L. Abel substituted by Eden Tan, plaintiff-appellant.’ This is misleading, it said, because Felipe L. Abel was never substituted as plaintiff except by his heirs upon his death. If an order of substitution is needed before the heirs of a deceased party can become parties in a case, more so in the case of a mere assignee of the interest of a party.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Ortega has the standing to appeal as purchaser in the execution sale in an order of redemption in favor of the judgment debtors?

HELD:

No, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Admittedly, no formal motion for intervention was filed by petitioner, her participation being merely confined to filing an "Urgent Ex Parte Motion for an Order of New Title and Issuance of Owner's Certificate of Title,", followed by a "Supplementary Motion for Issuance of New Titles" of 12 July 1989, as well as in the evidentiary hearings regarding the padded costs in the redemption price.

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof,” may file a motion for intervention with leave of court with notice upon all the parties to the action.

Such motion may be allowed or disallowed by the court after considering if the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and if the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

There was no such motion for intervention filed. As such, she was thereby never recognized as an intervenor. The filing of pleadings incidental to the execution process did not, ipso jure, give her the legal standing of a party in interest to the main case.

Petitioner insists that it would be the "quintessence of injustice to deny her the right to appeal from trial court’s order." “Not even a deeply held persuasion in the righteousness of a cause can justify playing loose with the rules,” the Court said.

"Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."

The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

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People of the Philippines vs. Quiachon

2008-06-24T10:51:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006

Criminal Law, Penalties, Rape

FACTS:

Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed against her eight-year-old deaf-mute daughter in 2001. Key witnesses for the prosecution were the victim and her 11-year-old brother; for the defense, it was appellant’s mere bare denial. The victim’s testimony was supported by medico-legal findings indicating rape. The trial court found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to death plus payment of damages. On automatic appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and also imposed civil indemnity. Notably, Republic Act 9346 was enacted on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not appellant is guilty of rape based on the evidence presented?

2.) Whether or not death was still the proper penalty imposed in view of RA 9346, considering that the crime was committed before the law’s enactment?

3.) That in case death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, is civil indemnity still proper?

HELD:

On the first issue, the Court finds the accused guilty. In rape cases, the credibility of complainant's testimony is the primordial consideration in determining if accused is guilty, and the trial court is in a better position to determine such, having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' behavior. The victim’s testimony was "simple, straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by inconsistency or contradiction." It was further corroborated by the medico-legal report. From this damning evidence, appellant's simple denial of the charge against him must fail.

On the second issue, reclusion perpetua, not death penalty, is the proper penalty in this case in view of RA 9346. Although the crime was committed before the law was enacted, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda, or penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. (Article 22, Revised Penal Code) But appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of RA 9346 provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."

On the third issue, even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in RA 9346, civil indemnity is still proper because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The award of civil indemnity shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."

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Associated Bank vs. Court of Appeals

2008-06-24T01:32:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G. R. No. 123793, June 29, 1998

Commercial Law, Corporation, Merger, Negotiable Instruments, Promissory Note

FACTS:

Associated Banking Corporation and Citizens Bank and Trust Company (CBTC) merged to form just one banking corporation known as Associated Citizens Bank (later renamed Associated Bank), the surviving bank. After the merger agreement had been signed, but before a certificate of merger was issued, respondent Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. executed in favor of Associated Bank a promissory note, promising to pay the bank P2.5 million on or before due date at 14% interest per annum, among other accessory dues. For failure to pay the amount due, Sarmiento was sued by Associated Bank.

Respondent argued that the plaintiff is not the proper party in interest because the promissory note was executed in favor of CBTC. Also, while respondent executed the promissory note in favor of CBTC, said note was a contract pour autrui, one in favor of a third person who may demand its fulfillment. Also, respondent claimed that he received no consideration for the promissory note and, in support thereof, cites petitioner's failure to submit any proof of his loan application and of his actual receipt of the amount loaned.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not Associated Bank, the surviving corporation, may enforce the promissory note made by private respondent in favor of CBTC, the absorbed company, after the merger agreement had been signed, but before a certificate of merger was issued?

2.) Whether or not the promissory note was a contract pour autrui and was issued without consideration?

HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Associated Bank assumed all the rights of CBTC. Although absorbed corporations are dissolved, there is no winding up of their affairs or liquidation of their assets, because the surviving corporation automatically acquires all their rights, privileges and powers, as well as their liabilities. The merger, however, does not become effective upon the mere agreement of the constituent corporations. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and majority of the respective stockholders of the constituent corporations must have approved the merger. (Section 79, Corporation Code) It will be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of a certificate of merger. Records do not show when the SEC approved the merger.

But assuming that the effectivity date of the merger was the date of its execution, we still cannot agree that petitioner no longer has any interest in the promissory note. The agreement itself clearly provides that all contracts — irrespective of the date of execution — entered into in the name of CBTC shall be understood as pertaining to the surviving bank, herein petitioner. Such must have been deliberately included in the agreement in order to avoid giving the merger agreement a farcical interpretation aimed at evading fulfillment of a due obligation. Thus, although the subject promissory note names CBTC as the payee, the reference to CBTC in the note shall be construed, under the very provisions of the merger agreement, as a reference to petitioner bank.

On the issue that the promissory note was a contract pour autrui and was issued without consideration, the Supreme Court held it was not. In a contract pour autrui, an incidental benefit or interest, which another person gains, is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person. The "fairest test" in determining whether the third person's interest in a contract is a stipulation pour autrui or merely an incidental interest is to examine the intention of the parties as disclosed by their contract. It did not indicate that a benefit or interest was created in favor of a third person. The instrument itself says nothing on the purpose of the loan, only the terms of payment and the penalties in case of failure to pay.

Private respondent also claims that he received no consideration for the promissory note, citing petitioner's failure to submit any proof of his loan application and of his actual receipt of the amount loaned. These arguments deserve no merit. Res ipsa loquitur. The instrument, bearing the signature of private respondent, speaks for itself. Respondent Sarmiento has not questioned the genuineness and due execution thereof. That he partially paid his obligation is itself an express acknowledgment of his obligation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

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Luzon Stevedoring Co. vs. Court of Tax Appeals

2008-06-21T02:29:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. L-30232, July 29, 1988

Taxation, Nature of Taxation, Tax Exemption

FACTS:

Petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Co. seeks to secure a tax refund from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for its payment of compensating tax in importing engine parts and other equipment for the repair and maintenance of its tugboats. It contends that tugboats are included in the term cargo vessel under the tax exemption provisions of Section 190 of the Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act 3176; that the law treats a tugboat towing a barge loaded with cargoes for loading and unloading to constitute a single vessel. Thus, the engines, spare parts and equipment imported by it to repair and maintain its tugboats are exempt from compensating tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner's “tugboats” are considered "cargo vessels" subject to compensating tax exemption under the law?

HELD:

No, the instant petition is without merit.

The law, specifically the amendatory provisions of Republic Act 3176, limits tax exemption from the compensating tax to imported items to be used by the importer himself as operator of passenger or cargo vessel or both, whether coastwise or oceangoing, including engines and spare parts of said vessel.

Here, the petitioner’s "tugboats" are not "cargo vessels" because they are mainly employed for towing and pulling purposes, not in carrying or transporting passengers or cargoes. In fact, a tugboat is defined as a strongly built, powerful steam or power vessel, used for towing and, now, also used for attendance on vessel.

The Court reiterates that "as the power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty, the relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate, must be strictly construed, and the same must be couched in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied."

The general rule is that any claim for exemption from the tax statute should be strictly construed against the taxpayer.

The petition is dismissed.

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Ancheta vs. Ancheta

2008-06-20T01:30:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004

Annulment of Marriage, Civil Law, Marriage

FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?

HELD:

NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”

“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.”

Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner “without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.”

The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.”

Petition is GRANTED.

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Santiago v. COMELEC

2008-06-19T04:50:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Constitutional Law, People's Initiative, Political Law

FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative?

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

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G & M Philippines, Inc., vs. Romil V. Cuambot

2008-06-19T00:11:00.000-07:00

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 162308 November 22, 2006

Illegal Dismissal, Labor Law, Overseas Employment

FACTS:

Respondent Romil V. Cuambot was deployed to Saudi Arabia as a car body builder with petitioner G & M Philippines, Inc., a duly licensed placement and recruitment agency. On a two-year employment contract, he worked with the Al Waha Workshop. However, respondent did not finish his contract and returned to the Philippines barely six months later. Upon returning, he immediately filed before the NLRC a complaint for unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of plane ticket and repatriation bond, which was later amended to include illegal dismissal, claim for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, actual, exemplary and moral damages, and attorney’s fees.

Respondent Cuambot alleged that at the Al Waha Workshop where he worked, he was subjected to inhumane and unbearable working conditions. Except for a meal allowance of 100 Riyals a month, he was not paid his monthly salary of 1,200 Riyals. And he was required to render six (6) hours of overtime work daily, except Friday, without overtime pay; he was also seriously insulted by his employer every time he demanded for his salary, and some of the letters sent to him by his family were withheld by his employer.

He thus filed a petition for payment of the unpaid salaries including interests, until the same will be fully paid.

Petitioner G & M insisted that respondent was religiously paid his salaries as they fell due. After working for a little over seven months, respondent pleaded with his employer to be allowed to return home since there were family problems he had to settle personally. Respondent even submitted a resignation letter. To support such claim, petitioner submitted in evidence copies of seven payslips duly authenticated by the Philippine Labor Attaché in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Respondent countered that his signatures in the purported payslips were forged. He also stated that he was never given a copy of the contract of employment. To counter the allegation of forgery, petitioner claimed that there was a great possibility that respondent had changed his signature while abroad so that he could file a complaint for illegal dismissal upon his return. The argument that the stroke and handwriting on the payslips was written by one and the same person is mere conjecture, as respondent could have requested someone, to prepare the resignation letter for him. Petitioner further pointed out that respondent has different signatures, not only in the pleadings submitted before the Labor Arbiter, but also in respondents’ personal documents.

On January 30, 1997, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent Cuambot, finding unreliable the G & M's evidence of Cuambot's alleged signature in the payslips which was similar to the handwritings in the payslips and the handwritings in the purported resignation letter of the Cuambot. In an appeal to the NLRC, the latter remanded the case to its origin for referral to a government agency that can conduct calligraphy examination on the questioned documents.

The case was then re-raffled to another Labor Arbiter, and this time, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The new Labor Arbiter said the respondent failed to substantiate his claim of poor working conditions and long hours of employment. The fact that he executed a handwritten resignation letter was enough evidence of the fact that he voluntarily resigned from work. Respondent also failed to submit any evidence to refute the payslips duly signed and authenticated by the labor attaché in Saudi Arabia, inasmuch as their probative value cannot be impugned by mere self-serving allegations. The Labor Arbiter concluded that as between the oral allegations of workers that they were not paid monetary benefits and the documentary evidence presented by employer, the latter should prevail.

Respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter failed to consider the genuineness of the signature which appears in the purported resignation as well as those that appeared in the seven payslips. He insisted that these documents should have been endorsed to the National Bureau of Investigation Questioned Documents Division or the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for calligraphy examination.

The NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. It held that the questioned documents could not be endorsed to the agency concerned since mere photocopies had been submitted in evidence. It also stressed that the parties had earlier agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence on record; that if respondent had wanted to have the documents endorsed to the NBI or the PNP, he should have insisted that the documents be examined by a handwriting expert of the government. Thus, respondent was estopped from assailing the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.

On a petition for certiorari before the CA, the latter reversed the ruling of the NLRC. According to the appellate court, among others, a visual examination of the questioned signatures would instantly reveal significant differences in the handwriting.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the employee voluntarily resigned from employment or was illegally dismissed?

RULING:

We find in respondent’s favor. That the petitioner failed to submit the original copies of the payslips and the resignation letter raises doubts as to the veracity of its claim that they were actually signed by the respondent.

As correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the courts. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting “with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.”

Even a cursory perusal of the resignation letter and the handwritten pay slips will readily show that they were written by only one person.

Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, in order to give effect to the policy of the State to “afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers,” and to “assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.”

The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

(Copyright 2008 - This original digest of a Supreme Court case may be copied, distributed or modified in any medium provided you acknowledge barops-philjuris.blogspot.com.)

Mary Abigail's Food Services vs. CA and Perla B. Bolando

2008-06-18T01:28:00.000-07:00

Case Digest: G.R. No. 140294 May 9, 2005

Labor Law, NLRC Rules of Procedure

FACTS:

Mary Abigail’s Food Services, Inc. terminated petitioner Bolando's services as a counter-girl due to excessive tardiness and falsification of time record. Contending that her dismissal by reason of tardiness is unjust, harsh and unreasonable, and that she was denied due process as she was not given an opportunity to be heard, Bolando filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC-NCR a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of separation pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, etc., against Abigail’s. Petitioner contended that Bolando was accorded full due process before she was terminated and that there was basis in her dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but ordered Mary Abigail's to pay respondent separation pay and other benefits. Petitioners received, thru counsel, their copy of the aforementioned decision of the Labor Arbiter on December 23, 1998. As such, the last day of the 10-day period for them to take an appeal therefrom to the NLRC under the Labor Code would be on January 2, 1999. Because January 2, 1999 was a Saturday, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Partial Appeal on the following business day, January 4, 1999, a Monday, and subsequently posted a surety bond only on January 7, 1999. However, the NLRC ruled that the required bond was posted three (3) days beyond the 10-day reglementary period for perfecting an appeal and thus, it dismissed petitioners’ appeal “for failure to perfect the same within the reglementary period”.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, contending that their late filing of the required bond should not prejudice the perfection of their appeal considering the timely filing of their Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Partial Appeal, and the liberal interpretation given to the provisions of the Labor Code in the matter of appeal bond in cases involving monetary awards, as in the instant case. Said motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, maintaining that the NLRC should have relaxed the time-requirement for the posting of appeal bond, additionally claiming that the long holiday (Christmas season) which followed their receipt on December 23, 1998 of the Labor Arbiter’s decision rendered the timely filing of the required bond impossible. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ appeal with the NLRC was correctly dismissed for failure to perfect the same by not posting the required bond within the reglementary period provided for by law?

RULING:

Petition is dismissed. The NLRC correctly dismissed petitioners’ appeal for failure to perfect the same by not posting the required bond within the reglementary period provided for by law.

Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, pertinently provides that decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on the following grounds, one of which is in case of a judgment involving a monetary award where an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

On the other hand, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC clearly provides that the appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of the Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

It is clear both in the Labor Code and its implementing rules that an appeal to the NLRC from any decision, award or order of the Labor Arbiter must have to be made within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decision, award or order with proof of payment of the required appeal bond accompanied by a memorandum of appeal. And where, as here, the decision of the Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, the appeal is deemed perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond also within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decision in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.

The posting of a cash or surety bond is a requirement sine qua non for the perfection of an appeal from the labor arbiter’s monetary award. Notably, the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with the requirements therefore is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment sought to be appealed final and executory. Such requirement cannot be trifled with.

Here, while it is true that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal and memorandum of partial appeal, they admittedly posted the required bond three (3) days late. Hence, their appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC was never perfected.

(Copyright 2008 - This original digest of a Supreme Court case may be copied, distributed or modified in any medium provided you acknowledge barops-philjuris.blogspot.com.)

HOW TO BECOME A MEMBER OF BAROPS-PHILJURIS EMAIL LIST

2008-06-05T03:16:00.000-07:00

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2008-06-05T02:02:00.000-07:00

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LEGAL ETHICS

2008-06-03T09:59:00.000-07:00

Following is a list of case digests in Legal Ethics. This site is new and I am still adding more cases into the site. Thus, please bear with the sparse content so far.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Alfredo Manasan (Duty of the Clerk of Court)
Huyssen vs. Gutierrez (Lawyer in Government Service, Duty to the Constitution)

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REMEDIAL LAW

2008-06-02T09:45:00.000-07:00

Following is a list of case digests in Remedial Law. This site is new and I am still adding more cases into the site. Thus, please bear with the sparse content so far.

People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. (Evidence, Chain of Custody)
Selected Cases in Provisional Remedies (Preliminary Injunction, Preliminary Attachment, Receivership, Support)
Selected Cases in Special Civil Actions (Special Civil Action, Interpleader, Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Forclosure of Mortgage, Partition, Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer, Contempt)
Remiendo vs. People (Evidence, Public document)
Jurisprudence on Forum Shopping
Lorenza Ortega vs. Court of Appeals (Civil Procedure)

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CRIMINAL LAW

2008-06-01T12:03:00.000-07:00

Following is a list of case digests in Criminal Law. This site is new and I am still adding more cases into the site. Thus, please bear with the sparse content so far.

People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. (Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs, RA 9165)
People vs. Cabalquinto (Rape, RA 7610, RA 9262)
People of the Philippines vs. Quiachon (Penalties, Rape)

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MERCANTILE LAW

2008-06-01T12:01:00.000-07:00

Following is a list of case digests in Mercantile Law. This site is new and I am still adding more cases into the site. Thus, please bear with the sparse content so far.

Selected cases on commercial documents and chattels (Warehouse Receipts, General Bonded Warehouse, Letters of Credit, Trust Receipts)
Associated Bank vs. CA (Corporation, Merger, Negotiable Instruments, Promissory Note)

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TAXATION LAW

2008-06-01T11:57:00.000-07:00

Following is a list of case digests in Taxation Law. This site is new and I am still adding more cases into the site. Thus, please bear with the sparse content so far.

Luzon Stevedoring Co. vs. CTA (Nature of Taxation, Tax Exemption)

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CIVIL LAW

2008-06-01T11:54:00.000-07:00

Following is a list of case digests in Civil Law. This site is new and I am still adding more cases into the site. Thus, please bear with the sparse content so far.

Annulment Venue
Jurisprudence on Partition
Ancheta vs. Ancheta (Annulment of Marriage, Marriage)

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LABOR LAW

2008-06-01T11:48:00.000-07:00

Following is a list of case digests in Labor Law. This site is new and I am still adding more cases into the site. Thus, please bear with the sparse content so far.

San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC (Employer-Employee Relationship)
Sime Darby Employees vs. NLRC (NLRC Rules of Procedure, Illegal Dismissal)
Pamplona Plantation Company vs. Ramon Acosta (Illegal Dismissal, Liability of Corporate Officers)
G & M Philippines vs. Cuambot (Illegal Dismissal, Overseas Employment)
Mary Abigail's Food Services vs. CA and Bolando (NLRC Rules of Procedure)

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POLITICAL LAW

2008-06-01T11:39:00.000-07:00

Following is a list of case digests in Political Law. This site is new and I am still adding more cases into the site. Thus, please bear with the sparse content so far.

Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco (Constitutional Law, State Immunity Against Suit)
Osea vs. Ambrosio (Administrative Law)
MIAA vs. Joaquin Rodriguez - Justice Tinga ponencia (Expropriation)
Gudani vs. Senga - Justice Tinga ponencia (E.O. 464, Executive Privilege)
Santiago v. COMELEC (Constitutional Law, People's Initiative)

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CRIMINAL LAW - Ratio Decidendi

2008-01-16T00:14:00.000-08:00

People vs. Ang (Illegal Recruitment) - August 6, 2008